Despite the continuing growth of Internet use in Russia, there remains little systematic analysis of online election campaigning. This article presents an in-depth, multi-method analysis of party and candidate online activity during the 2011 State Duma election campaign -arguably Russia's first 'Internet election' -to ascertain the extent to which new social media is changing politics in Russia.
Introduction
has had little success in translating previous parliamentary majorities into government control (Roberts 2012a) . If election winners do not form government and if opposition parties are not seriously promoting alternatives to the prevailing regime, then in theoretical terms at least, these parties resist the usual means-end goals analysis typical for vote and office seeking parties. In other words, does the internet offer any real advantage to parties in a system where opposition parties never win and where the winner never gains power?
Even if we acknowledge that Russian party goals are likely to be slightly different from those traditionally theorised, there are reasons to suspect that the attractiveness of online campaigning for political parties in general has been exaggerated. This is seen clearly in the counter argument to the equalisation hypothesis, where studies have shown that smaller parties lack the expertise and resources to challenge larger parties in the virtual world (Small 2008) and where the Internet merely serves to reproduce real-world inequalities.
In the Russian case, there is a clear 'real world' inequality aspect to take into account when considering the December online campaign. Not only was United Russia the electorally dominant party At the same time, studies suggest that, regardless of the unquestioned interactive potential of the internet, parties may be reluctant to engage in too much online debate, discussion and collaboration with Internet users (Lilleker et al. 2010; Trammell et al. 2006, p. 23) , questioning the interactivity hypothesis. After all, parties are, by and large, top-down organisations that tightly control information flows, more interested in selling a political product to voters than co-creating one. Some studies have also questioned the motivation of individual candidates to seriously engage with the internet, suggesting that many simply supply themselves with a 'cosmetic' internet presence in order to create a virtual (and somewhat meaningless) confirmation that they are forward-thinking politicians in tune with the latest technological developments (Gibson & Ward 2000, p. 302) .
Although notions of 'bandwagoning' suggest that candidates will attempt to imitate the perceived online success of their US and European counterparts, candidates in Russian elections are operating in a different political and cultural context that may mitigate the role of the Internet in campaigning. The Russian party-list, proportional representation voting-system in place at the time of the 2011 State Duma election represents a significant context specific institutional factor mitigating against online campaigning, as it creates thousands of candidates with little prospect of gaining a Duma seat, and so little incentive to develop an online presence. Studies conducted on Norwegian parliamentary elections, for example, show how candidates' positions on party lists affect onlinebehaviour and campaigning style (Karlsen & Skogerbo 2013) . There are also considerations of Russia's unique electoral geography to take into account, such as the uneven distribution of voters in each region and varying levels of internet penetration -factors which have received no empirical analysis to date, but which could affect levels of online campaigning.
There are also biographical considerations to take into account, not least the role of genderan important point in a male dominated political environment such as Russia's, although some studies suggest that male politicians are actually more publicity-seeking than women (Aalberg & Strömbäck 2011 ). There are also generational influences. For example, while young people increasingly report using the Internet on a regulate basis (Trammell 2007 (Trammell , p. 1255 , there is some suggestion that the older generation are more 'technology averse' and less likely to use the Internet and all its interactive features effectively (Norton 2007; Oates 2010) . This is by no means irrelevant when considering some of the generational characteristics of Russian parliamentary politics.
In the Fifth Duma Convocation (2008-11) on the eve of the election, the youngest deputy was a youthful 24, but the oldest a far from sprightly 75 years of age. Despite efforts to create greater circulation within United Russia and to attract younger candidates, the average age of the party's faction in the Fifth Duma Convocation (2007-11) was 53, just a little way behind the CPRF faction (58). In addition, the leaders of the three main opposition parliamentary parties heading into the December election (A Just Russia, LDPR and CPRF) had a combined age of 189 (Mironov, born 1953 , Zhirinovskii 1946 and Zyuganov 1944 . While not a convincing reason to expect less online engagement, generational factors raise awareness to the potential importance of a range of as-of-yet unforeseen factors relating to the Russian political system that may influence the way parties and candidates use the Internet.
To what extent did competing parties develop an online presence?
The seven parties that successfully registered with the CEC included the electorally-dominant and selfproclaimed 'centrist' United Russia, which won a constitutional majority of 315 out of 450 seats in the previous December 2007 election. Along with United Russia, there were three other 'parliamentary parties' or parties with parliamentary representation, including the socialist-leaning A Just Russia, its left-wing competitor, the CPRF and the nationalist LDPR. The remaining three parties hoping to pass the seven per cent threshold included the nationalist Patriots of Russia and two liberal-leaning parties in the form of Right Cause and Yabloko. No characterisation of the post-Yeltsin party-system is without its problems, in particular the applicability of left/right ideological distinctions, but a frequently blogged complaint from all party candidates during the election campaign was the lack of distinction between party messages.
Party web-presence
Although the official start of party mobilisation was signalled by President Medvedev's election announcement on August 30, 2011, the main focus of this study was on party candidate activity during the 28 day 'intensive campaign period' that began on November 6, 2011. According to electoral law, all registered parties received free airtime and press coverage to promote their platforms in the period November 6 -December 4 2011, with the final 24 hours designated as the 'quiet period', in which party agitation in the mainstream media was prohibited.
However, prior to this main focus, an initial exploration of party web-presence was conducted in September 2011, with the aim of confirming that each party had at least a foothold in the virtual world. In terms of party web-presence, it was unsurprising that each of the seven parties maintained one central website, with regional branches of A Just Russia, the CPRF, the LDPR, United Russia and Yabloko operating secondary sites. With the exceptions of Patriots of Russia and Right Cause, these main party sites were updated regularly and were well-linked to other partisan websites, including leader websites and party pages on a host of social networks. The main social networks included 
Candidates online
Although the initial audit revealed the existence of well-maintained party websites and social networking accounts, in reality, quantifying the overall web-presence of the parties was impossible due to the sheer scale of their online engagement, as well as the problem of verifying if an account was officially sanctioned by the party (United Russia and its 'support websites' is a case in point).
However, candidate web-presence was a different proposition and, in many ways, revealed the true extent of online campaigning. After all, voters were not only choosing between competing parties, but between thousands of candidates running on party lists across 83 subjects of the Federation.
To address the issue of candidate web-presence, party lists were selected in 20 regions. In total, these 20 regions yielded 140 separate party lists and 910 candidates, with their web-presence ascertained by individually entering their name and details into the Russian language Yandex search engine. This was repeated a total of three times for each candidate, first to search for the existence of individual websites, second for candidate Twitter accounts and third for LiveJournal accounts -the basis of the analysis provided below.
Owing to the large number of candidates and the numerous social networks accessible to them, a decision was made to limit analysis to Twitter and LiveJournal. Both sites were popular coming into the December election and both have very distinct qualities for the purposes of party campaigning, as discussed in more detail in the next section. With all but a handful of cases, the identity of the candidates was corroborated with the help of the biographical information supplied by the CEC on each individual registered to run in the election. This is by no means unimportant, as 'identity' issues represent perhaps the greatest problem related to online research and there were plenty of examples of 'black PR' and online identity theft during this campaign.
In terms of candidate age and internet presence, throughout the twenty regions, the average age of Tweeters (39.8) and LiveJournal bloggers (42) was slightly lower than the overall average age of the 910 candidates analysed (46.8). But overall, age was not found to have a significant association with candidate web presence ( Table 1 ). The same was true for gender (Table 2) In the absence of significant association between either age or gender and web presence, what other factors can account for the failure of significant numbers of candidates to maintain websites, Twitter accounts and LiveJournal blogs during the 2011 election campaign? As mentioned in the previous section, the bandwagon hypothesis is a generalised prediction that both candidates and parties will follow voters into the virtual world based on past successes in the US and EU, where growing internet use has been successfully utilised by vote-seeking actors. However, the Russian context has enough uniqueness, both in cultural and institutional terms to question the utility of borrowing campaign strategies from elsewhere. While cultural differences are difficult to operationalise and deserve separate analysis, the cross-regional aspect of this study provides an opportunity to test some assumptions about the role of electoral geography (the relative size of the electorate in each region), internet penetration (the varying number of internet users in each region) and the role of the closed-list PR voting system (candidates' positions on the party lists) as factors potentially affecting the probability that a candidate would have a web presence during the 2011 State Duma election campaign. Table 3 presents the results of a logistic regression on the binary outcome of web presence/absence. 4 Table 3 
: Logistic Regression Model of Web Presence
As shown in the results of the logistic regression, candidates' position on the party list, the number of registered voters in a region and party affiliation had statistical significance in increasing the probability that a candidate would have a web presence. Candidates occupying the top three places on a regional party list had around 47 per cent greater odds of having a web presence than candidates occupying positions 8 or lower (the reference category). This gives some support to the notion that socalled 'locomotives' or candidates with high name recognition, who are typically placed at the top of party lists to attract voters (Samuels 2002: 468) , are likely to possess greater web presence relative to candidates lower down the list. Elsewhere, large regions with 4,000,000 or more voters increased the odds of candidate web-presence by around 26 per cent compared to the reference category of regions with an electorate of less than 1,000,000. What this suggests is that a range of country specific institutional factors associated with the electoral and wider political system are likely to affect the potential of the Internet, above and beyond the level of internet penetration in any particular setting -a subject in need of more research.
More importantly, at least from the perspective the equalisation hypothesis, there was a clear quantitative advantage for United Russia, in terms of the number of candidates with a web presence. As the breakdown in Table 4 shows, United Russia (43.7%), but also A Just Russia (27.8%), appeared to have the edge in terms of the number of candidates with websites, Twitter accounts and Livejournal blogs. In fact, in the Russian context, the idea of a relationship between web presence and resources appears to find support from earlier studies. Semetko & Krasnoboka, for example, examined incipient internet use at the time of the 1999 State Duma election and found that, of all the types of parties online, it was the resource rich 'parties of power' that were more likely to have websites (Semetko & Krasnoboka 2003, p. 85) . By 2011, the party of power and its candidates was more likely to win on most quantitative indicators of web-presence, although 'how' and 'if' this advantage was translated into effective use is a little more difficult to answer -the subject of the next section.
How were candidates using social media? Evidence from Twitter and LiveJournal
The choice of Twitter and LiveJournal for detailed analysis is relevant for a number of reasons. At the time of the December 2011 election, Twitter was a relatively new social network in Russia, but one enjoying rapid growth, ranked the seventeenth most popular RuNet site at the start of the intensive campaign period.
5 Twitter essentially functions as a personalised means of telling the virtual world what you are doing (Honeycutt & Herring 2009: 1) , but its actual value as a campaign tool is restricted by its limited format. Although impossible to outline party pledges or other details of the party platform, Twitter's ability to create a relatively large following in a short period of time, as well as the overall ease and speed of its use make it ideal for mobilising voters to attend party events, and in the Russia case, demonstrations and street gatherings that were occurring regularly during the campaign period. The ability to directly reply to individual tweets and to insert hyperlinks and hashtags to connect to wider topics forms the basis of its 'interactive' potential.
In contrast to the Twitter micro-blog, the purpose of LiveJournal, as with blogs in general, is to declare your presence, 'to affirm that your thoughts are at least as worth hearing as anyone else's' (Coleman 2005: 274) . LiveJournal, unlike Twitter, was a well-established social network ranked tenth on RuNet in 2011 and the most popular Russian blog site. Although popularised by former president Dmitry Medvedev, it originally garnered a reputation as a refuge for Russian intellectuals (Rutten 2009 ), but in terms of election campaigning, its longer format offers candidates an ideal medium to communicate their position, the party position and to comment on other candidates and parties. Its interactive component is based around the ability of readers to leave comments to specific journal entries, while the use of tags enables blog authors to link individual entries around themes.
Twitter and LiveJournal analysis
The results of the regional analysis highlighted a relatively small number of Twitter users, with only 45 accounts from the 910 candidates in the sample (see Table 5 ). In many ways, the low level of Twitter In order to better understand how candidates were using Twitter, a coding scheme was employed based on a previous study of US congressmen (Golbeck & Grimes 2010) . This scheme involved placing tweets into one of seven categories including; direct communication, personal message, activities, information, requesting action, fund raising and unknown messages. The advantage of this coding scheme is that it gives a clear indication of the way candidates were using Twitter during the intensive campaign period, while the ability to aggregate data shows variations according to party.
It should be noted that the applicability of a coding scheme derived from US politics was relatively unproblematic due to Twitter's limited format, which gave users less room to innovate. A 10 per cent sample of tweets were analysed by a second coder, with inter-coder reliability using the Holsti formula established at 0.84.
6 Table 6 : Twitter analysis (% per category)
What the results of the analysis show is that candidates were largely using Twitter to communicate directly with other Twitter users (replying to tweets using the @ convention) and to provide information, which typically involved informing followers of candidate and party-leader appearances in the mainstream media. More importantly, candidates were not using Twitter to directly mobilise supporters. Among all the opposition candidates, there were few 'requests for action' of any kind and no requests for supporters to attend party events, take to the streets or to take part in any political events. Requests for action, when they were made, focused exclusively on asking followers to send questions to the Tweeter and to send information concerning electoral fraud. A handful of tweets urged followers to vote for any party, except United Russia or as phrased by A Just Russia candidate, Andrei Karabedov, on December 1 2011: to '[vote] for any party, except the party of crooks and thieves'; using the offensive moniker popularised online by Aleksei Navalny. Conversely, the tiny number of United Russia tweets requesting action urged followers to vote in a more cautious way. As reminded by United Russia candidate, Andrei Isaev, two days before the election 'When voting remember your children. They will not forgive us if, instead of sustainable development there will be the endless abyss of revolutionary upheaval' (tweeted on December 2, 2011).
In comparative terms, the Russian candidate use of Twitter was similar to the study of US congressmen, where informational tweets accounted for just over half (54.7 per cent) of all tweets analysed (Golbeck & Grimes 2010 , p. 1615 . However, the candidates analysed in this study, as indicated by Table 6 , were more likely to use Twitter to directly reply to other tweets and Twitter users.
In many ways, this reinforces the nature of this medium at the time of the election as one confined to a relatively small band of political elites, more like a light-hearted online debating club than a medium for mass mobilisation.
LiveJournal, on the other hand, was a more established social network and there was a strong likelihood that it would reveal greater usage among candidates as well as evidence of equalisation. In terms of analysis, its less standardised format necessitated a broader approach and so in addition to recording interactivity through the use of tags and counts of reader comments, entries were also analysed through the lens of so-called 'functional theory of campaign discourse'. Functional theory of voting is based on a number of underlying assumptions, principally that campaign discourse is aimed at winning an election by convincing citizens to vote for a particular candidate or party. In essence, voting is considered to be a comparative act (Benoit et al. 2003, p. 2) and so the three options available for candidates to convince voters and positively distinguished themselves are to acclaim (engage in selfpraise); to attack (criticise other candidates); and to defend (refute attacks made on them).
These categories were applied to a total of 322 individual LiveJournal entries, each one coded according to the function of the entry. Although many blogs had elements of all three functions, a sentence count was made to determine the overriding single function for each. Entries that had no obvious function or which made no political statement were left un-coded. As with Twitter, a sample (64 entries -20 per cent) were analysed by a second coder and the resulting inter-coder reliability was established at 0.96.
As noted, the purpose of applying a functional theory of campaigning was to provide an extra level of analysis for the LiveJournal blogs, although the applicability of this theory is by no means uncomplicated. This theory was developed from a specific political and cultural context, namely US as the American equivalents. However, one may surmise that individual candidates were either campaigning for a seat in parliament or to boost the overall status of the regional branch of the party.
The results of this analysis are presented below. Another important anomaly to take into account is the interaction of the audience, or those potential voters candidates were trying to mobilise. In this case, interaction does not relate to candidate use of hashtags, hyperlinks, tags, etc., but in the low levels of active, as opposed to passive, engagement on the part of the online audience. Although this aspect of active and passive engagement was less apparent with Twitter in its more limited format, with LiveJournal it was clearly evident in the number of comments and responses left to individual entries. As shown in Table 8 , the number of comments posted was generally low, lending support to the idea that the audience for party political sites tends to be either sympathisers or those sharing similar interests (Norris 2003, p. 24) , but by no means a broad spectrum of Internet users. One explanation for the low number of comments, especially those posted to candidate LiveJournal entries, was the content of the blogs. As shown in Table 8 , a large proportion of all individual entries can be described as 're-posts', or entries that were cut and pasted from other blogs, links to YouTube clips, or replicated articles from online news providers. this point -of low levels of engagement with the political Internet -finds support in opinion poll data collated just after the 2011 State Duma election. Despite the millions of Russian using the Internet on a regular basis, of a sample of 1600 respondents, 87 per cent confirmed that they never used the Internet to find information on current political issues (Rose 2012, p. 35) .
Conclusions
Russian elections have typically been viewed as sub-competitive or 'free', but by no means 'fair' for much of the post-Soviet period, in particular in the post-Yeltsin period. The competitive playing field is often skewed in favour of the ruling party, in no small part due to the fact that existing laws ensuring equal media access are rarely enforced. At the same time, the close overlap between the state and United Russia means that many party candidates have regular media exposure in their official, nonparty capacity, which is naturally difficult for voters (or election commissions) to distinguish. In some ways, the Internet is helping to overcome these problems, but the sheer expanse of the virtual world means that only very effective opposition strategies will attract significant numbers of uncommitted voters. In fact, the plight of opposition parties on the Internet can be much worse than in the real world, where a weak and poorly conceived Internet presence can create a virtual ghetto inhabited by a relatively small number of party supporters.
What this article has shown is that the significant increase in Internet use in Russia in the period between the 2007 and 2011 State Duma elections did not result in a significant engagement with this medium by parties and candidates for the purposes of campaigning. Moreover, candidates were either unaware or uninterested in interacting with voters and the feeling seems to have been mutual.
There is a case to be made that the combination of a relatively unfettered RuNet at the time of the 2011 State Duma election, the inability of United Russia to effectively turn its quantitative advantage into a successful online campaign and the harmonisation of the remaining six parties on an anti-United Russia message in some ways 'equalised' the competitive playing field for the December 2011 election. However, the fact that there was no evidence that candidates from the registered parties were using Twitter to mobilise supporters, and in view of the low levels of audience interaction with 
